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An experiment examined the effect that the type and presentation format of information 
about investment options have on expectations held by investors about asset risk, returns, 
and volatility.  Some respondents were provided with the names of investment options in 
addition to historical (1987- 7) volatility data, and some were not.  Historical volatility was 
presented either as a bar graph of returns per year or as a continuous density distribution 
of returns over the 10-year period.  Risk and volatility perceptions both varied significantly 
as a function of type and format of information, but in different ways.  Biases in risk 
perception, but not in volatility forecasts, affected portfolio decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
Investment portfolio decisions are supposed to be a function of expected returns, variance 
and the covariance structure of the returns of all available investment alternatives. Markowitz 
(1952) showed how to optimally select assets for a portfolio, using these variables. The Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) employed 
these variables in an equilibrium theory that allowed for asset pricing as well. 
Informational constraints or bounded rationality may prevent ordinary investors from 
considering correlations or covariances when making portfolio allocations.  However, at the very 
least, they should think about the expected return and likely variance of assets returns, or about 
other, more appropriate, measures of risk (Sarin & M. Weber, 1993; E.U. Weber, 1999)1.  This 
raises the question of how such investors might arrive at some expectation about the return and 
riskiness of assets, given the types of information usually available to them (e.g., provided by 
investment brokers, the internet, newspapers, or other newservices).  One possibility is that people 
use the past performance of investment options to predict future performance, that is, that they use 
historical returns to estimate future returns and their likely volatility or risk. In this context, the 
format in which historical returns are presented might influence estimates of future performance.  
Another possibility is that people use information such as macroeconomic indices, expected trends, 
or company-specific facts to arrive at expectations about the risks and returns of investment 
options. In this case, knowledge of the name of the investment becomes important, as the name 
indicates the type, market and other special characteristics of the asset. 
In this paper, we study the influnce of these two types of information on people’s 
perceptions of investment options and their asset allocation.  We also examine how perception and 
allocation decisions were affected by the format in which information about historical performance 
is provided. In a between-subject design, we provided potential investors with information about 
the historical performance of sixteen investment alternatives, using two different presentation 
formats. In addition to (or instead of) the historical return data, some i vestor  were also provided 
with the names or identity of these investment alternatives. We measured investors’ expectations 
of future returns as well as their volatility forecasts (i.e., the standard deviation of predicted 
returns) for the sixteen investment alternatives.  In addition to volatility forecasts, we also assessed 
investors’ perception of the riskiness of the investment options.  Finally, we elicited their portfolio 
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decisions. These data allow us to examine the relationship between objective, historical volatility 
and either expected volatility or perceived riskiness of assets.  They also allow us to test which of 
these two expectations is a better predictor of portfolio choices in a risk—return framework.  
Researchers from several discipline have been discussing different measures of risk and 
their ability to predict decisions under uncertainty in a risk—return framework (Keller, Sarin & M. 
Weber, 1986; E.U. Weber, 1988, 1999; Sarin & M. Weber, 1993; Brachinger & M. Weber, 1997; 
Jia, Dyer, & Butler, 1999; Baz, et al., 1999).  Whereas the utility of separating risk perception and 
perceived-risk attitude in risk—return models of risky choice is well established (Highhouse & 
Yuce, 1996; E.U. Weber & Milliman, 1997), less is known about the effect that th  type and 
format of investment information have on people’s perception of the options’ riskiness2.  In theory 
type and format should not have any influence on investors’ risk behavior.  But Unser (1999) 
found differences in judgments of the riskiness of hypothetical investment alternatives when 
participants were given past performance information in either charts of the historical asset prices 
or histograms of the historical returns.  Using a wide range of content domains, Ibrekk and 
Morgan (1987), on the other hand, found few systematic differences between the probability 
estimates of participants who had received information about stochastic variables in nine different 
presentation formats, including pie charts, histograms, boxplots, probability densities, and 
cumulative probabilities plots.  
Questions about the perception and proper communication of risk are of increasingly 
practical relevance.  In Germany, for example, banks and investment houses have recently been 
legally mandated to inform their clients about the risk of assets they intend to buy (WpHG 
No. 31(2)). In particular, they are required to inform investors about the past performance of 
assets, as well as special (e.g., industry-specific) risks.   The SEC in the U.S. has been 
contemplating similar regulations.  In this context, there is motivation to find out how type of 
information and presentation format influences investors’ perceptions of future risk and return, and 
how these perceptions influence portfolio decisions.
Our paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the experiment, conducted in 
Germany and the United States.  Section 3 proposes a model of volatility forecasts and risk 
perceptions. Section 4 presents the results of our tudy regarding the perception of expected 
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returns, expected risk, and expected volatility, as well as their effects on portfolio choice.  Section 
5 summarizes the insights and implications of our study. 
2. Experiment 
120 business students from the United States (Ohio State University) and Germany 
(Universität Mannheim) were asked to fill out a questionnaire that provided them with a series of 
judgment and decision tasks, in return for a payment of $10 in the U.S. and 15 DM in Germany.  
The response rate was 58% in Germany and 64% in the U.S. The data of three respondents (one 
German and two Americans) were removed from the study, because their responses were 
incomplete. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they had inherited $30,000 (in Germany: 50,000 
DM) from a distant relative and were committed to invest this money for one year. A deck 
containing sixteen cards provided information about sixteen investment alternatives (listed in 
Appendix A) which differed in country of origin (Germany or U.S.) and in type (bonds, stocks, 
index funds, etc.).  The identity of the individual stocks was varied between-subjects.  Crossed 
with this manipulation, five between-subj ct information conditions had information cards that 
provided the following information about each investment (see Appendix B for examples): 
1. Condition N : Only the name of the investment, as shown in Appendix A. 
2. Condition R- :  The annual % returns3 of each investment for the years 1987-974 as a bar 
chart, without he name of the investment.  
3. Condition R+ : The annual % returns of each investment for the years 1987-97 s a bar 
chart as in R-, and the name of the investment. 
4. Condition D- :  A continuous distribution5 of annual % returns, estimated from the annual 
return data for the years 1987-97, without  the name of the investment.  
5. Condition D+ : A continuous distribution of annual % returns as in D-, and the name of the 
investment. 
Participants who were provided with the names of the available investments (conditions N, R+, 
D+) also got an information sheet that provided a description of the different types of assets.   
Participants first made three predictions about the value that a 100 DM/$100 investment in 
each investment alternative would have after one year: a prediction of the median value, of a low r 
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bound (10%-percentile) and of an upper bound (90%-percentile).  They also rated (on a scale 
from 0 to 6) how competent they felt in making these predictions.  Participants then rated the risk 
of each investment (on a scale from 1 (no risk) to 9 (highes  risk)) by sorting the information cards 
representing the 16 investment options into three piles of low, intermediate, and high risk, and 
then further subdividing the cards in each of these three categories according to their riskiness.  
Finally, respondents created an investment portfolio by selecting up to five investments and 
indicated the relative percentage of each for their portfolio. To control for order effects, we 
counterbalanced the order in which the German and American investment options were presented. 
The questionnaire closed by asking respondents about their income bracket, prior investment 
experience, and knowledge about finance.  They also rated their risk attitude as showing either 
“little”, “moderate” and “great tolerance for risk”. 
3. Modeling Volatility Forecasts and Perceived Risk 
The regression models shown in Figure 1 assume that investors’ volatility forecasts and 
perception of the riskiness of an asset derive from information about the asset’s historical 
volatility. To test the hypothesis that the format in which historical volatility information is 
provided influences investors’ volatility forecasts and risk perception, we allowed the regression 
coefficient for historical volatility to differ for the two information format conditions R nd D.   
Appropriate dummy variables also tested for an effect of having knowledge of the names of the 
assets and for an effect of the type of asset.   Finally, one variant of the models also included  
investor-specific variables to control for our repeated-measures design.  
Volatility Forecasts 
Using  investor i’s stated median projected one-year return for each asset j (Y0.5ij), and the 
stated 10th and 90th percentile of possible returns (Y0.1ij and Y0.9ij), we calculated an estimate of 
respondents’ volatility forecasts (the projected standard deviation of one-year returns) by using the 
three-point approximation of Pearson and Tukey (see Keefer and Bodily (1983)): 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2ij29.0ij25.0ij21.0ijij mean100/Y3.0100/Y4.0100/Y3.0int)po(Vol -×+×+×=  
with 100/Y3.0100/Y4.0100/Y3.0mean 9.0ij
5.0
ij
1.0
ijij ×+×+×= . 
 5
Historical volatility of asset j was computed as follows.  Assuming lognormal stock prices 
and using the historical data of the years 1987-97, we estimated the parameters  and  of the 
lognormal distribution and used them to compute the volatility and mean of the historical asset 
returns for a one-year horizon (t=1)6: 
( )1ee)hist(Vol tt2j 2 -×= ×s×m×   with  tj e)hist(Mean ×m= . 
Model V1 regresses investors’ volatility forecasts on each asset’s historical volatility, 
allowing for an information-format specific effect, and on dummy variables for different types of 
assets:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ij
Kk
ijiijij kdk)D()D(d)R()R(d)hist(Vol.constint)po(Vol e+×a+b×+b×+b×+= å
Î
 
Parameters b , b(R) and b(D) describe the influence of historical volatility Vol(hist) on investors’ 
volatility forecasts. ( )iRd  and ( )iDd  are dummy variables that indicate the format in which 
historical volatility information had been provided (as a continuous Distributi n or as a bar graph 
of annual Returns): 
( )  
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Dummy variables ( )ijkd  characterize asset- pecific characteristics, as shown in Appendix C.  The 
( )ka are asset type specific regression coefficients, and the ije  are the residuals. 
Model V2 regresses volatility forecasts on historical volatility, again allowing for 
information-format effects, but also includes an investor-specific parameter, id , to control for the 
fact that the volatility forecasts in our repeated-measur s design are not independent: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ijiiijij DDdRRd)hist(Volint)po(Vol e+d+b×+b×+b×=  
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To see whether knowledge of the name or type of investment asset—in addition to historical 
volatility information—affects investors’ volatility forecasts, we analyzed whether the inv stor-
specific parameters, id , differed for participants who were provided with the names (and thus the 
types) of the assets and those that were not.  Residuals ije  were analyzed for asset-type specific 
effects. 
Risk Perception 
The models of investors’ judgments of the riskiness of each investment, shown in Figure 2, 
were modeled in essentially the same way as volatility forecasts, with the following differ nces.  
We used the logarithm of the historical volatilities as predictors, as those provided a better fit.  
Because of this, the parameters b(R) and b(D) of Model R1 are now additive constants:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ij
Kk
ijiijij kdkDDdRRd))hist(Vol100ln(  .constRP e+×a+b×+b×+b××+= å
Î
 
Model R2 again uses a two-step analysis, with the first step controlling for the repeated-
measures design by adding an investor-specific personal parameter to the regression: 
( ) ijijij )hist(Vol100lnRP e+d+b××=  
The second step analyzes these personal parameters for any effects of the format and type of 
information about the assets. In contrast to model V2, we tested for the format-specific ffect of 
information here by comparing the investor-specific parameters, since we did not use the 
proportional parameters b(R) and b(D) in this logarithmic odel.  Finally, we again analyzed the 
residuals for asset-type specific effects. 
 
4. Results 
Order Effects 
The order in which American and German assets were presented did not affect any of the 
respondents’ judgments in either country.
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Perception of Expected Returns 
In classical risk-value models, expected return is typically modeled as the expected value of 
returns, based on past performance of the asset.  Our data allowed us to test these assumptions.  
In particular, we investigated whether investors’ expectations of returns were equal to the 
expected value of historical returns and whether they were influenced (a) by the format in which 
information about historical returns was provided and (b) by having information about the name 
and type of available assets, above and beyond their historical returns. 
Investors’ expectations of asset returns (p r dollaror DM invested) were estimated as 
100/Y3.0100/Y4.0100/Y3.0mean 9.0ij
5.0
ij
1.0
ijij ×+×+×= .    To compare investors’ expectations of 
asset returns to the expected value based on historical returns, we used the following logarithmic 
measure7: 
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
=
j
ij
ij )hist(Mean
mean
ln)bias(Mean  
and calculated an average mean bias for each investor, i: 
å
=
=
16
1j
iji )bias(Mean16
1
)bias(Mean  
As shown in Table 1, expectations about asset returns closely resembled historical 
expected values, i.e., biases were close to zero.  Kruskal-Wallis tests for the German (p=0.416) 
and the U.S. data (p=0.266) showed that there was no significant information-for at effect on 
investors’ mean bias in the perception of the expected returns.  Knowledge of the asset names 
introduced only a fewasset-specific effects, i.e., mean biases that were different from 0 at the .05 
level of significance.  In particular, the returns of stocks of lesser-known companies were 
underestimated (German data: Henninger Bräu, -11.1%; Krom Schröder, -11.6%; Bethlehem 
Steel, -9.8%; US data: Henninger Bräu, -19.1%; Krom Schröder, -4.8%) and those of better-
known or more frequently discussed companies were ov restimatd (German data: B yer, 
+7.53%; US data: Boeing, +5.33%).  In both data sets,  average returns of stock index funds were 
overestimated by 2%-4% and returns of German bonds were underestimated by 2%-3%.   
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Volatility Forecasts 
Model V1—German Data.  As shown in Appendix D, model V1 predicted the volatility 
forecasts of German investors quite well, accounting for 53.6% of the total variance.  Volatility 
forecasts had a non-zero (5%) intercept and a regression coefficient for historical volatiliy of less 
than one.  Given that historical volatility is undoubtedly an imperfect predictor of future volatility, 
investors seem to have appropriately regressed their predictions towards the mean, as shown in 
Figure 3.  The format in which historical volatility information had been provided strongly affected 
investors’ volatility forecasts, with respondents in the D-condi ions forecasting additional volatility 
compared to the grand mean (b(D)=0.20, p=0.000) and respondents in the R-conditions 
forecasting less volatility (b(R)= -0.15, p=0.000).  There were several asset-specific effects. The 
volatility forecasts of foreign bonds was lower than those of other assets (after controlling for their 
historical volatility) (a(US-bonds)=-0.07, p=0.000), probably due to an underestimate of  
exchange rate risk, which is the main part of the risk of foreign bonds. Consistent with this 
interpretation, the dummy variable for U.S. bonds was significantly lower than that for German 
bonds.  There was some evidence of a home bi s (Kilka & M. Weber, 1997). While the volatility 
forecasts of foreign index funds were not different from those of other assets, the volatility of the 
domestic stock index fund was estimated to be lower (a(GER-stocks)=-0.05, p=0.001).  Finally, 
forecast of the volatility of investments on credit were lower than those of other assets 
(a(investment on credit)=-0.10, p=0.000).  
Model V1—U.S. Data.  Model V1 accounted for 27.4% of the total variance of the 
volatility forecasts of the American investors.  Volatility forecasts again had a non-zero (12%) 
intercept and a regression coefficient for historical volatility of less than one (b=0.44, p=0.000), 
showing even stronger evidence of regression towards the mean. Just as in the German data, 
investors in the D-conditions tended to forecast greater volatility than investors who had seen the 
same historical return information in the R-condition format (b(D)=0.16, p=0.003; (b(R)=-0.11, 
p=0.046).  Volatility of both German and U.S. bonds was estimated as lower than th t of other 
assets, after controlling for historical volatility.  
Model V2—German Data.  Similar to the results for Model V1, presenting historical asset 
volatility as a density distribution resulted in significantly higher volatility forecasts than 
presentation of the same historical returns in an annual return bar chart. The b coefficient was less 
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than one (b=0.459, p=0.000) and b(D) was significantly greater than zero (b(D)=0.297, p=0.000), 
while b(R) was not.  To examine the effect of knowing the names of the assets on volatility 
forecasts, we compared the i  of investors who were provided with the names of the assets 
(conditions D+, R+ and N) with those of investors who were not (conditions D- and R-).  For the 
former group (n=43), id  averaged 0.03; for the latter group (n=26), the average id  w s 0.07, a 
difference that was nearly significant on a 5%-level (p=0.054) by a Mann-Whitney test.  Knowing 
the name of the assets decreased investors’ estimates of future volatility.  Analysis of the residuals 
eij for asset-specific effects confirmed the results of model V1.  Forecasts of the volatility of bonds 
(and especially foreign bonds) was judged to be lower than that of other assets (a(US-bonds)=-
0.04, p=0.000).   There was again evidence of a home bias, with U.S. stock indices receiving 
significantly greater volatility forecasts (a(US-stocks)=0.054; p=0.000). Forecasts of the volatility 
of investments on credit were also again lower (a(investment on credit)=-0.061, p=0.000).   
Model V2—U.S. Data.  Just as for the German data, presenting historical asset volatility as 
a density distribution resulted in higher volatility forecasts than presentation of the same historical 
returns in an annual return bar graph. b was less than one (b=0.40, p=0.000) and b(D) was greater 
than zero (b(D)=0.20, p=0.002), while b(R) was not.  Comparing the personal constants for 
investors who were or were not provided with the names of the investments, we again found a 
slightly smaller average id  for the first group (0.10) than for the second group (0.11), though the 
difference was not significant (p=0.276).   Examination of the asset-specific effects showed that 
estimates of the volatility of both German and U.S. bonds were lower than that of other assets 
(a(GER-bonds)=-0.027, p=0.024 and (US-bonds)=-0.035, p=0.003).  
Visual Summary.  To illustrate the information condition effects on volatility forecasts 
described in this section, we standardized investors’ volatility forecasts in the same way we 
standardized their return expectations, i.e., by dividing forecasts by historical levels8: 
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
=
j
ij
ij )hist(Vol
int)po(Vol
ln)bias(Vol , 
and calculating an average volatility bias Vol(bias)ij for each investor: 
å
=
=
16
1j
iji )bias(Vol16
1
)bias(Vol . 
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Figure 4 plots average volatility bias as a function of information condition for German and 
American respondents.  The left panel shows that German investors tended to provide future 
volatility estimates that were significantly lower than historical volatility.  Volatility forecasts 
differed as a function of the information condition.  The median volatility bias for respondents who 
were just provided with the name and type-descri tion of the sixteen assets (condition N) was -
.65, i.e., investors provided volatility forecasts that were smaller than historic volatility.  The 
median bias was -.34 for participants received only the bar graph of historical returns over the past 
ten years, without knowing the name or type of the underlying assets (condition R-). The median 
bias (i.e., underestimation) was even larger when these two types of information were combined 
(condition R+: -.71). Participants who were provided with only historic volatility information as a 
density distribution (condition D-), on the other hand, gave volatility forecasts that were larger 
than historic volatility, i.e., had a median bias of  +.09).  Knowing also the name and type of the 
assets (condition D+) again resulted in lower volatility forecasts, for a median bias of -.24. In 
general, volatility forecasts were greater when historic volatility information came in the form of a 
density function, which focuses attention on extreme outcomes which are visually more prominent 
in this presentation format. That is, investors in the D-condi ion may have paid too much attention 
to possible extreme values, while ignoring their low probability of occurrence.  A Kruskal-Wallis
test rejected the null-hypothesis that the forecast biases under the five information-conditions were 
equal (p=0.006). In a Mann-Whitney U test, differences between pairs of conditions were 
significant for N/D- (p=0.006), R-/D- (p=0.008), R+/D- (p=0.001) and R+/D+ (p=0.049). 
The right panel of Figure 4 shows the average volatility forecast biases of American 
investors, which differed from those of German investors in absolute, but not relative, terms. 
American investors tended to provide higher volatility forecasts across all 16 investment assets, 
perhaps because the historical volatility in the United States from 1987 to 1997 was lower than 
volatility in Germany.  When comparing forecast bias in the five information conditions, we find 
similar results as for the German data. Again the R conditions lead to a lower perception of 
volatility than the D conditions. R+ and N again lead to the most negative bias (medians of -.19 
and -.15) and condition D- to the most positive bias (median of +.22).  A Kruskal-Wallis test of  
differences between conditions was again significant (p=0.013). A Mann-Whitney U-test showed 
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that differences between pairs of conditions were significant for R-/R+ (p=0.050), R-/D- 
(p=0.009), R+/D- (p=0.000) and R+/D+ (p=0.044). 
Risk Perception 
 Model R1—German Data.  Model R1 accounted for 68.8% of the variance in the 
judgments of perceived riskiness of investment assets by German respondents. As shown in 
Appendix E, most of the predictor variables were significant9.  Est m ted model parameters were 
reasonable, with a constant of -3.15 and a b of 2.67, for example, predicting that an investment 
with a historical volatility of 4.73% would be classified as having "no risk" (PR=1). The maximum 
risk category ("highest risk", PR=9) would be reached with a historical volatility of 94.67%. The 
historical volatilities calculated in Deutschmark in our study range from 5.73% to 55.24%, which 
correspond to risk ratings of PR=1.51 and PR=7.56.  Just as for the volatility forecasts, there was 
a significant tendency to rate asset risks higher in the D-conditions that provided investors with 
estimated density functions of historic returns (b(D)=0.332, p=0.007). Different from the volatility 
forecasts, there was a weaker but significant tendency to also rate assets higher in risk in the R-
conditions, where historical returns of the years 1987 to 1997 were provided as a bargraph 
(b(R)=0.287, p=0.025), relative to the N-condition.  Examination of the asset-specific effects 
confirmed our hypothesis that exchange rate risk were underestimated, as the risk of American 
bonds was rated significantly lower than that of other assets ((US-bonds)=-1.192, p=0.000), 
again controlling for historical volatility. There also was evidence of a home bias in risk 
perceptions.  The risk of German stocks was judged to be significantly lower than that of other 
assets (a(GER-stocks)=-0.891, p=0.000), while the risk of U.S. stocks was not significantly 
different.  Just as for the volatility forecasts, there was a tendency to underestimate diversification 
effects, by judging the risks of mixed portfolios to be higher than that of other assets 
((a(portfolios)=0.454 p=0.001). 
Model R1—U.S. Data.  Model R1 accounted for 52.3% of the variance of the risk 
judgments of American respondents.  Model parameters (a constant of -2.88 and a b of 2.80) were 
such that the lowest historical volatility calculated in U.S. dollar of 5.41% corresponded to a 
perceived risk of PR=1.84 and the highest volatility of 54.98% to PR=8.34.  Perceived risk did not 
differ significantly as a function of information condition.  The risk of U.S. bonds was judged to be 
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lower than that of other assets (a(US-bonds)=-0.568, p=0.009), while the risk of German bonds 
was not significantly different, probably because of the extraordinary low historical volatility of the 
German bonds calculated in U.S. dollar. Whi e not significant, there was a trend in the direction of 
a home bias for stocks. The risk of mixed portfolios was again significantly larger than average 
(a(portfolios)=0.639, p=0.000). 
Model R2—German Data.  Model R2, designed to control for the repeat d-measures 
design of our study, yielded essentially the same results as model R1.  Figure 5 provides the mean 
of investors’ personal parameters, id , in the five information conditions. Participants who knew 
the names of the assets (conditions N, R+ and D+) perceived less risk (i.e., had more negative 
id ’s) than participants who only had statistical information about the historical returns (conditions 
R- and D-)  (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.026).  Especially the group that had only the name of the 
assets (condition N) perceived asset risks to be low.  Furthermore, risk perceptions were higher 
for participants who were provided only with the estimated density functions (condition D-) than 
for participants who were provided only with the historical returns bar graph (conditions R-).  
Analysis of the residuals ije  (in conditions N, R+ and D+) for asset-specific effects showed the 
same effects as model R1: risk perception was lower for U.S. bonds (a(U -bonds)=-0.832, 
p=0.000) and German stocks (a(GER-stocks)=-0.524, p=0.000), and higher for portfolios  
(a(portfolios)=0.457, p=0.000). 
Model R2—U.S. Data.  The results of model R2 again confirmed those of model R1. 
Knowing assets names resulted in lower perceptions of risk, just as in the German data.  While an 
omnibus Kruskal-Wallis test of differences between information conditions was not significant 
(p=0.396), investors in conditions that informed them of asset names had marginally more negative 
personal constantsid than investors in the other conditions (Man-Whitney U test: p=0.068). The 
asset-specific results described above were also confirmed (a(US-bon s)=-0.482, p=0.014; 
(a(portfolios)=0.568, p=0.003). 
Summary of Perceptions of Future Return, Volatility, and Risk 
While investors’ perception of expected returns were not affected by information 
conditions, type and format of information clearly influenced their perceptions of future volatility 
and asset risk.  Providing historical return information in the form of an estimated density function 
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rather than as a bar graph of annual returns led to greater estimates of volatility and risk, 
consistent with the results of Ibrekk and Morgan (1987).  Knowledge of the name and type of 
assets, on the other hand, led to lower estimates of volatility and risk.  Differences in the format in 
which historical volatility information was provided had a larger impact on volatility forecasts than 
risk perception, whereas knowledge of name and thus type of assets had a larger effect on risk 
perception. 
Our results regarding the effects of information format on volatility forecasts and risk are 
consistent with Raghubir and Das’ (1999, p. 64f) hypothesis that “decision makers may be prone 
(...) to initial anchoring.  Decision makers sample from an information distribution; the points that 
are most perceptually salient (such as the end-points of the distribution) are the most likely to be 
selected as initial anchors in the decision pro ess.”   The density distributions of the D-conditions 
of our experiment made extreme values far more salient than the bar graphs of the R-conditions, 
resulting in greater estimates of asset risk and especially volatility.   
The home bias hypothesis (Kilka & M. Weber, 1997) predicts that volatility and risk of 
foreign assets should be judged to be higher than that of domestic assets.  This prediction was 
confirmed only for stocks. For bonds, we found the opposite results for German investors, who 
provided lower estimates of the risk and volatility of U.S. bonds than German bonds, probably 
because exchange rate risk (which is the major risk of foreign bonds) was underestimated. We did 
not find this result in the U.S. data, probably because of the amazingly low historica  volatility of 
German bonds (calculated in U.S. dollar).  In both countries, we found clear evidence that 
investors underestimated the risk-reducing effect of diversification. A dummy variable that tested 
for such an effect (encoding international portfolios and bond/stock-portfolios) was positive for 
the regressions of volatility forecasts and significantly positive for those of risk perceptions.  
Raghubir and Das (1999, p. 62) demand that models of information processing ought to 
“include the stages of perception of existing information, retrieval of information from memory, 
and integration of multiple sources of information.”  Our experimental manipulations and models 
described above successfully separated and integrated perc ptual biases resulting from the format 
in which statistical information about historical returns (existing information) was provided and 
memory biases that were driven by knowledge of asset names and types (which allowed the use of 
information from memory).   
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Information format and prior knowledge about asset types affected vol tility forecasts and 
risk perceptions i  similar but not identical ways.  The correlation between volatility forecasts and 
perceived risk was .57 (p<0.0001) for the German data and .45 (p<0.0001) for the U.S. data, 
confirming that volatility forecasts and perceived risk are related but not identical constructs.   
Explaining Asset Choices  
To examine the effect of investors’ expectations about asset risk, volatility, and return on 
their portfolio decisions, we compared the ability of six variants of a risk-value model to predict 
asset choices.  For each investor, we tested investor’s belief about the risks and values of the 16 
available assets as a function of their decision to select or n tto selectthe assets for their 
portfolio.  Belief about risk was operationalized in one of three ways as: (a) assets’ historical 
volatility, (b) the investor’s volatility forecast, or (c) the investor’s perceived risk judgment.  
Belief about value was operationalized in one of two ways as: (a) historical expected return, or 
(b) the investor’s return expectation (see Table 2). 
Comparing the fit of risk—value models that differed in their operationalization of risk, we 
found that the models that used either historical vola ility or investors’ forecast of future volatility 
did not predict observed asset choices nearly as well as the models that used investors’ judgments 
of perceived risk. This result confirms previous demonstrations of the fact that variance-based risk 
measures as used, for example, in the Markowitz (1952) model, are worse than subjective risk 
assessments in describing portfolio decisions (E.U. Weber, 1997, 1999; E.U. Weber & Hsee, 
1998)10. 
These results are confirmed and visually illustrated by comparing the residuals of models 
V2 and R2 (that controlled for historical volatility and information format effects) for assets in 
two groups: residuals of assets that had been chosen by the investor rsus residuals of assets that 
had not been chosen.  Figure 6 show  the median residuals of model V2 (i.e., of the regression of 
investors’ volatility forecasts) for both chosen and non-chosen assets.   These residual show that 
volatility forecasts are not a good predictor of asset choice in either the German data (left panel) 
or the U.S. data (right panel).  For both groups, the residuals indicate that the judged volatility of 
chosen assets was, in fact, higher than the judged volatility of non-chosen assets, which would 
suggest a dubious asset-sel ction rule.   
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The story is different for the relationship between investors’ perceptions of asset risk and 
asset selection.  Figure 7 shows the median residuals of model R2 (i.e., of the regression of 
investors’ asset risk judgments) for both chosen and non-chosen assets.   These residual show that 
risk perception is related to asset choice in a sensible way, with the risks of chosen assets judged 
to be lower than the risks of non-chosen assets. 
Even though there was relatively little bias in investors’ perceptions of expected returns, 
as discussed earlier, perceived expected return still explained asset choices better than historical 
expected returns, though only significantly so for the German data.  Figure 8 illustrates this in its 
plot of the residuals of the regression of perceived asset returns on historical returns, for both 
chosen and non-chosen assets.  The residuals show that investors had higher return expectations 
for chosen assets than for non-ch sen assets, consistent with the notion that they used their 
(biased) return expectations in their asset selection. 
In summary, perceived asset risk and perceived expected asset returns provided the best 
prediction of asset choices within a risk—value framework for investors in both countries.  Given 
that our study identified a number of ways in which both perceptions of returns and perceptions 
of risk were biased in systematic ways, we can make predictions about biases in asset allocation 
that should be expected as a consequence.  As discussed earlier, returns were expected to be 
higher for better-known or more frequently discussed stocks than for stocks with less name-
recognition, predicting that such stocks should be more frequently s lected.  This prediction was 
confirmed in our data and is also found in real financial markets.   
Risk perception, on the other hand and as discussed above, was affected by the format in 
which historical volatility information was provided, with asset risk judged to be greater in the D-
conditions.  This bias in risk perception also resulted in differences in asset allocation.  Assigning 
the 16 assets to four classes of assets of increasing riskiness11, we found that investors in D-
conditions (who overestimated risk) tended to buy less risky assets than the investors in R-
conditions.  This effect failed to reach significance however, probably because of the high within-
condition variances of investment allocations.    
In general, there were fewer differences in asset allocation between experimental 
conditions than in risk and volatility expectations, most likely because investors do not apply 
risk—value models (even simpler, more descriptive versions) in the appropriate way.  Instead, 
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investors have been shown to engage in naive diversification (Benartzi & Thaler, 1998; 
Siebenmorgen & M. Weber, 2000).  The results of our study also showed that investors did not 
fully understand the effect of diversification on risk.  It is also likely that investors selected asse s 
using rules that compared relative, rather than absolute, levels of risk and return.  If so, then 
biases in perceived risk and returns would not affect asset allocations in our study that varied type 
and format of asset information in a between-subject design.  Future studies may want to vary the 
type and format of asset information in a within-subject design.  
Our data suggest that asset allocation decisions were driven by risk and return 
expectations, rather than the other way around.  While we found strong effects of type and format 
of asset information on risk perception and volatility forecasts, information-driven effects on asset 
selection were much weaker.  Secondly, while volatility forecasts and risk perceptions were 
significantly correlated and risk perceptions and asset choices were significantly correlated, 
volatility forecasts and asset choices were not.  If reports of perceived asset risk were the result of 
portfolio decisions (rather than the other way around), we should not find either of these two 
patterns of results.  
In their own assessment of risk attitude (as showing “little”, “moderate” or “great” 
tolerance for risk), most respondents chose the “moderate”-opti n. Using a Kruskal-Wallis test, 
we found that differences in self-as ssment of risk-attitude predicted differences in risk perception 
for the American investors.  Investors who characterized themselves as having greater tolerance 
for risk tended to report lower levels of perceived risk (i.e., had lower personal constants id in 
model R2) (p=0.006), consistent with the result that apparent differences in risk attitude are often 
the result of differences in risk perception, rather than attitude towards risk as it is perceived (E.U. 
Weber & Milliman, 1997; E.U. Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2000).  
Finally, there was no relationship between the number of finance courses respondents had 
taken at their university or their actual investment experience and their judgments and asset 
selections in our experiment. 
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5. Conclusions and Implications 
Determinants of Asset Choices 
The results of our study can be summarized as a mixture of “good news” and “bad news.”  
On the positive side, investors’ asset allocation decisions clearly utilized information about 
historical volatility and mean historical returns of assets.  However, expectations of future asset 
returns and especially asset risk were biased in systematic ways as a function of factors that should 
not have had any effect (e.g., presentation format of historical returns) and fail d to be influenced 
factors that should have had an effect (e.g., diversification).  Our results also show that perceived 
asset risk is not synonymous with expected volatility and that it is perceived risk, rather than 
expected volatility, that determines asset selection.  A summary of these results is provided in 
Figure 9. 
 
Proper Risk Perception and Risk Communication 
Our results confirm the importance of the ongoing discussion about the correct measure of 
perceived risk mentioned in the introduction.  They provide some insights about possible 
extensions of current models of risk to account for perceptual biases that are driven by attributes 
other than just the probability distribution of a single dimension (E.U. Weber, 1988, p. 201), e.g., 
historical returns.  Our study shows that, in the financial asset domain, people’s risk perceptions—
among other things—show evidence of a home bias, underestimate exchange rate risks and 
underestimate diversification effects.
The results of our study also illu trate that legal mandates about the proper communication 
of asset risks need to consider not only the type of asset information with which financial 
institutions should provide potential investors, but also the format of any such information, e.g., 
historical returns.  Given that nominally equivalent presentation formats lead to different 
impressions of asset risks, which translate into differences in investment behavior, and given that 
no gold standard exists to indicate a correct level of perceived risk, policy makers need to realize 
that decisions about the appropriate content and format of financial risk communication cannot be 
made in an objective or value-free fashion.  
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Appendix 
A. Available Investments in our Study
 
Inv. No. condition A1 condition A2 
1 German Government bonds (TTM12 5 years) 
2 German Government bonds (TTM 10 years) 
3 Mannesmann Bayer 
4 Henninger Bräu Krom Schröder 
5 DAX (German Stock Index) 
6 DAX on credit 
7 50/50 portfolio of DAX and German bonds 
8 U.S. Government bonds (TTM 5 years) 
9 U.S. Government bonds (TTM 10 years)
10 McDonalds Boeing 
11 Halliburton Bethlehem Steel 
12 S&P 500 (U.S. Stock Index) 
13 S&P 500 on credit 
14 50/50 portfolio of S&P 500 and U.S. bonds 
15 50/50 portfolio of S&P 500 and DAX 
16 50/50 portfolio of German and U.S. bonds 
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B. Information about Investment Returns 
Example for conditions D+ 
                    
US3: Density of 1-year returns of McDonalds
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C. Definition of asset-specific dummy variables: 
 
Investment no. 
d(k)ij 
1 2 3 
(A1) 
3 
(A2) 
4 
(A1) 
4 
(A2) 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
(A1) 
10 
(A2) 
11 
(A1) 
11 
(A2) 
12 13 14 15 16 
GER-bonds 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 
US-bonds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 ½ 
GER-stocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 ½ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 
US-stocks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 ½ ½ 0 
Mannesmann 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bayer 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Henninger Bräu 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Krom Schröder 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mc Donalds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Boeing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Halliburton 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bethlehem Steel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
investment on credit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
portfolios 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 
N.B.: The asset-specific dummy variables are only 1 or ½ if the participant j knows the name of the assets (conditions N, R+ and D+) 
otherwise (conditions R- and D-) the dummy variable is always 0. 
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D. Results of model V1
German data: 
(R2=53.6%) 
Coefficientsa
.0496 .0104 4.769 .000
.6714 .0458 14.651 .000
.2000 .0352 5.683 .000
-.1454 .0363 -4.010 .000
-.0351 .0154 -2.286 .022
-.0676 .0145 -4.668 .000
-.0538 .0163 -3.296 .001
.0207 .0165 1.251 .211
-.1777 .0287 -6.198 .000
.0458 .0279 1.642 .101
-.1958 .0291 -6.720 .000
-.0068 .0287 -.239 .811
-.0855 .0267 -3.208 .001
.0475 .0280 1.698 .090
-.0846 .0267 -3.162 .002
.0367 .0286 1.286 .199
-.1022 .0208 -4.916 .000
.0152 .0123 1.232 .218
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Vol(his)a. 
 
U.S. data: 
(R2=27.4%) 
Coefficientsa
.1161 .0095 12.172 .000
.4405 .0629 7.004 .000
.1639 .0543 3.021 .003
-.1105 .0552 -2.001 .046
-.0391 .0164 -2.378 .018
-.0474 .0166 -2.857 .004
-.0075 .0186 -.401 .688
-.0175 .0189 -.926 .355
-.0232 .0405 -.573 .567
.0533 .0274 1.944 .052
-.1250 .0440 -2.844 .005
.0068 .0297 .230 .818
.0019 .0395 .048 .962
.0516 .0284 1.816 .070
.0383 .0396 .968 .333
-.0171 .0298 -.576 .565
.0225 .0219 1.025 .305
.0194 .0145 1.343 .179
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Vol(his)a. 
 
 22
E. Results of model R1 
German data: 
(R2 = 68.8%) 
Coefficientsa
-3.1460 .3179 -9.897 .000
2.6692 .0938 28.462 .000
.3315 .1236 2.683 .007
.2865 .1274 2.248 .025
-.2361 .1845 -1.280 .201
-1.1924 .1574 -7.576 .000
-.8910 .1774 -5.021 .000
-.1906 .1753 -1.087 .277
-1.4971 .3005 -4.982 .000
.0693 .3078 .225 .822
-.4338 .3023 -1.435 .152
.4731 .3074 1.539 .124
-.1365 .2871 -.475 .635
.1206 .3013 .400 .689
.5682 .2950 1.926 .054
.9796 .3065 3.196 .001
-.0357 .2063 -.173 .863
.4536 .1319 3.438 .001
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: RPa. 
 
U.S. data: 
(R2=52.3%) 
Coefficientsa
-2.8836 .3384 -8.521 .000
2.8004 .1020 27.464 .000
.1462 .1734 .843 .399
.1167 .1762 .662 .508
-.0658 .2069 -.318 .750
-.5683 .2171 -2.618 .009
-.2287 .2338 -.978 .328
-.3195 .2341 -1.365 .173
-1.5983 .5032 -3.176 .002
-.2369 .3440 -.689 .491
-1.8406 .5157 -3.569 .000
-.6149 .3597 -1.710 .088
.5315 .4926 1.079 .281
-1.5614 .3528 -4.426 .000
.2126 .4952 .429 .668
-1.0287 .3599 -2.858 .004
-.2538 .2704 -.939 .348
.6385 .1817 3.515 .000
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: RPa. 
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F. Significance of the Results 
 
Volatility Forecasts Risk Perception 
German data 
(one year) 
U.S. data 
(one year) 
German data 
(one year) 
U.S. data 
(one year) 
 
V1 V2 V1 V2 R1 R2 R1 R2 
constant>0 4  4       
b<1 4 4 4 4     
b(D)> b(R) 4 4 4 4 ü  ü  
b(D)>0 4 4 4 4 4  ü  
b(R)<0 4 ü 4 ü 6  5  
 
Information-
driven 
results 
names lead to underestimation  ü 
p=0.054 
 ü  4  ü 
p=0.068 
bonds underestimated 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ü 
a(foreign bonds)< a(domestic bonds) 4 4 5 5 4 4 6 6 
a(foreign stocks)> a(domestic stocks) 4 4 ü ü 4 4 ü ü 
a(investments on credit)<0 4 4 5 5 ü ü ü ü 
 
Asset-
specific 
results 
a(portfolios)>0 ü ü ü ü 4 4 4 4 
 
shadowed fields = evaluation not possible; V1/R1 = Method 1 ("ordinary" regression), V2/R2 = Method 2 (two-step regression
considering the participant-specific dependency in the data); 4 = significant result (p<0.05), ü = found but not significant, 5 = not 
found, 6 = not found and opposite is significant (p<0.05) 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Modelling Volatility Forecasts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Modelling Risk Perception 
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Figure 3: Historical and Perceived Volatilties 
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Figure 4: Volatility Forecasts 
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Figure 5: Risk Perception 
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Figure 6: Effects of Biases in Volatility Forecasts on Investment Decisions 
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German data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.017)      U.S. data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.078) 
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Figure 7: Effects of Biases in Risk Perception on Investment Decisions 
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          German data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.000)      U.S. data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.000) 
 
Figure 8: Effects of Biases in Return Perception on Investment Decisions 
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            German data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.000)     U.S. data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.060) 
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Figure 9: Dependencies in the Investment Decision Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Perception of Expected Returns 
( )j)bias(MeanAverage   
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German participants U.S. participants 
N -.012 +.038 
R- -.023 +.016 
R+ +.001 +.010 
D- -.023 -.008 
D+ -.025 +.008 
 
market 
historical 
volatility 
of returns 
historical 
average of 
returns 
knowledge of names 
format of information 
asset-specific effects 
knowledge of names 
format of information 
asset-specific effects 
subjective 
volatility 
forecasts 
subjective 
risk 
perception 
subjective 
perception 
of expected 
returns 
 
portfolio 
decision 
some asset- 
specific effects 
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Table 2: Fit of risk-value models 
(a) historical expected return (b) investors’ return 
expectations 
German data U.S. data German data U.S. data 
 
Z p Z p Z p Z p 
(a) assets’ historical volatility -2.52 0.012 -5.84 0.000 -4.04 0.000 -4.44 0.000 
(b) investors’ volatility forecasts -2.31 0.021 -0.87 0.386 -3.73 0.000 -1.39 0.170 
(c) investors’ risk judgements -6.69 0.000 -6.44 0.000 -6.83 0.000 -5.43 0.000 
Z- and p-value result from a Mann-Whitney U test, which tests the difference between the exemplary 
performance measures return-1.0· volatility (first two rows) and return-0.05· risk (last row) depending on 
the investment decision. 
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Footnotes 
                                         
* Dipl.-Wi.-Ing. Niklas Siebenmorgen (siebenmo@pool.uni-mannheim.de) and Prof. Dr. Martin Weber 
(weber@bank.BWL.uni-mannheim.de), Lehrstuhl für ABWL, Finanzwirtschaft, insbesondere 
Bankbetriebslehre, Universität Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim 
** Prof. Dr. Elke U. Weber ( uw2@columbia.edu), Columbia University, 406 Schermerhorn Hall (MC-
5501), 1190 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027 
*** This research was supported by Sonderforschungsbereich 504 and the Graduiertenkolleg 'Allokation auf 
Finanz- und Gütermärkten' at the Univ rsity of Mannheim and by NSF grant SES-0096015. We thank 
Angelika Eymann and all members of the 'Behavioral Finance Group' in Mannheim for useful comments. 
1 We will not consider any liquidity constraints here. 
2 Bull, Stone & Sieck (1998) examine the i fluence of different graphical presentations on perceived risk. 
3 For the German questionnaires we used historical data calculated in Deutschmarks; for the U.S. 
questionnaires the data was calculated in U.S. dollars. 
4 We compared the 10-year data with 30-year data and did not find major differences. 
5 For the German questionnaires, we assumed the returns to be normal. For the American questionnaires, we 
assumed the returns to be lognormal.  
6 See Hull (1993), chapter 10.2 
7 We use this logarithmic measure to make sure that overestimations and underestimations are weightened 
equally. Alternatively we used a linear measure like 1
)hist(Mean
mean
)bias(Mean
i
ij
ij -=  and we get 
qualitatively similar results. 
8  Again we find similar results using a linear measure. 
9 We also evaluated model R1 using an ordered probit analysis and got qualitatively similar results. 
10 Psychological literature (Wells, 1992; O. Huber, Wider & O.W. Huber, 1997; Windschitl & Wells, 
1998) also describes the tendency that people do not base theirdecisions under uncertainty on information 
about probabilities. 
11 Domestic bonds / foreign bonds and portfolios of bonds and stocks / stock indices / individual stocks and 
stocks on credit 
12 Time to maturity 
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